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Abstract
This study estimates spatial representations of recent elections in Canada, France, The
Netherlands and Israel. Its purpose is to test whether there exist systematic differences in the
extent of spatial dispersion among parties and candidates in the majoritarian and proportional
electoral systems. Canada and France are majoritarian systems, while The Netherlands and
Israel are highly proportional. The study uses a measure of central tendency developed by
Kollman et al. (1992, 1993, 1998) [Kollman, K., Miller, J.H., Page, S.E., 1992. Adaptive
parties in spatial elections. American Political Science Review, 86, 929–937; 1993. Adaptive
parties and spatial voting theory. In: Grofman, B. (Ed.), Information, Participation & Choice.
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 161–173; 1998. Political parties and electoral
landscapes. British Journal of Political Science, 28, 139–158] and non-parametric statistical
tests to compare the relative dispersion of parties and candidates across the maps. The analysis
reveals that parties and candidates in the majoritarian systems are located significantly closer
to the center of the distribution of voters than those in proportional systems. The estimated
spatial maps also provide information useful for interpreting the bases of electoral politics in
each country. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Positive theories of the effects of electoral systems on the position-taking incen-
tives faced by candidates and political parties have largely emerged only in the last
decade. Studies by Cox (1987, 1990, 1991, 1997) initiated the contemporary litera-
ture. These studies use the spatial theory of voting to determine whether a given
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electoral system induces convergent or non-convergent electoral incentives. By clari-
fying the spatial incentives provided to candidates and parties, this research provides
insight central to understanding the organization of party systems (Katz, 1980), the
dynamics of government formation (Laver and Schofield, 1990) and the character-
istics of policy representation (Huber and Powell Jr, 1994). However, a correspond-
ing body of empirical research has lagged behind these theoretical advances. Only
a handful of studies empirically evaluate the relationship between electoral rules and
spatial incentives.
This study provides a spatial analysis of recent elections in Canada, France, Israel
and The Netherlands. It contributes to the empirical spatial theory debate on electoral
systems and spatial strategies by empirically testing whether majoritarian and pro-
portional systems produce systematic differences in party and candidate locations.
Metric multidimensional scaling is used to estimate the spatial positions of parties
and voters in the 1993 Canadian federal election, the 1994 Dutch parliamentary
election, the 1988 French presidential and general elections and the 1992 Israeli
Knesset election. These countries differ in majoritarian and proportional character-
istics but share other important similarities. Canada, The Netherlands, and Israel are
parliamentary systems, while France combines presidentialism with a parliamentary
assembly. All are multiparty systems with at least five parties securing legislative
representation in each country’s most recent national election. Canada is majoritarian
with high electoral thresholds and consistent single party control of parliament.1 The
Dutch and Israeli systems are highly proportional, with effective thresholds below
5% and with a coalition government as the norm. France presents an intermediate
case, but scholars typically describe the Fifth Republic in majoritarian terms (Lijphart
1984, 1994; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Shugart and Carey, 1992). Table 1 reports
Table 1
Electoral formula, district magnitude and effective number of partiesa
Country Canada (1993 France (1988 The Netherlands Israel (1992
general election) presidential (1994 Knesset election)
election) parliamentary
election)
Formula Simple plurality Majority-runoff PR-d’Hondt with PR-d’Hondt with
,1% threshold 1.5% threshold
District magnitude 1 1 150 120
ENP votes 3.92 4.26/3.27 5.71 4.93
ENP seats 2.35 3.00/2.31b 5.42 4.40
a Data sources: Canada, LeDuc (1994); France, Goldey and Johnson (1988); Israel, Arian and Shamir
(1995); The Netherlands, Anker and Oppenhuis (1994).
b The first figure is the effective number of parties as calculated from the first round National Assembly
vote receipts. The second figure is the effective number of parties as calculated from the second round
National Assembly vote receipts.
1 Canada’s multiparty system is attributed to the strength of regional parties, especially the Bloc Que´-
be´cois and the western Reform Party.
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the salient electoral system features, including electoral formula, district magnitude
and the effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties for each country.
The data used to estimate the spatial maps are obtained from the 1993 Canadian
Election Study (Johnston et al., 1993) the 1992 Israeli Election Study (Asher and
Shamir, 1992a,b), the 1994 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (Anker and Oppen-
huis, 1994) and the 1988 French National Election Study (Pierce, 1988). The esti-
mated maps locate parties and voters in the same space. Then a measure of spatial
dispersion developed by Kollman et al. (1992, 1993, 1998) is used to calculate the
extent to which parties and candidates are concentrated near the center of the political
space or dispersed towards the periphery of the space. The Kollman et al. centrality
measure permits comparison of the party and candidate dispersion across maps. To
foreshadow, the maps reveal that parties in the majoritarian systems are located sig-
nificantly closer to the center of the distribution of voters than those in pro-
portional systems.
2. Theoretical expectations and empirical evidence
The conventional expectation is that majoritarian systems induce convergent spa-
tial incentives and that proportional systems induce divergent spatial incentives. The
rationale is intuitive. Majoritarian systems support fewer parties (Taagepera and Shu-
gart, 1989; Lijphart 1984, 1994), and are designed to confer government control on
a single party. Because there exists little possibility of a coalition government, polit-
ical parties must maximize vote share and win the election to implement desired
policies. With few parties, vote maximizing locations are typically near the center
of the electoral space. Conversely, proportional systems support more parties, and
through the mechanics of proportional representation parties can influence govern-
ment policy with relatively small vote shares. A greater number of political parties
also limits the spatial mobility of parties and produces vote maximizing positions
for some parties away from the center of the space. The combined effect of these
incentives is to induce some candidates or parties to locate closer to the periphery
of the electoral space.
Theoretical studies present more complex analyses and are divided according to
whether the electoral system is considered in isolation or in conjunction with the
politics of government formation. Cox (1987, 1990, 1997) studies the relationship
between electoral systems and spatial incentives. Cox argues that of the four major
electoral system variables — formula, district magnitude, ballot structure and, while
not strictly exogenous, the effective number of parties — district magnitude has the
largest influence on spatial incentives. Systems characterized by low district magni-
tude — the number of seats in each district — induce convergent spatial incentives,
while systems characterized by high district magnitude induce divergent spatial
incentives. Surprisingly, electoral formula — the arithmetic rule that translates votes
to seats — has little independent impact on spatial incentives (Cox, 1991). In prac-
tice, however, electoral formula and district magnitude are closely linked (Lijphart,
1994, Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Proportional formulas, by definition, operate on multi-
112 J.K. Dow / Electoral Studies 20 (2001) 109–125
member districts. Majoritarian formulas often operate in conjunction with single-
member districts, although there are important exceptions.2
For proportional systems, Schofield (Schofield, 1993, 1995, 1997a, 1997b; Scho-
field et al., 1998; also see Laver, 1997) considers the case where parties consider
the politics both of elections and government formation. Schofield’s (1993) key result
is that to facilitate post-election coalition bargaining some parties may pursue rela-
tively moderate electoral strategies to increase the likelihood of influencing the com-
position and policies of the post-election government. Optimal spatial location
depends on the marginal trade-off between winning an additional seat and the likeli-
hood of being included in the governing coalition. Parties bound by credible commit-
ments to declared policy positions will seek to maximize the expected value of a
lottery over parliamentary seats and the policies enacted by potential coalition
governments. The resulting spatial incentives are typically more moderate than sug-
gested by models that only consider electoral incentives.3
The political implications of these incentives are well documented. Majoritarian
electoral systems provide clear political choices, but do not represent the preferences
of heterogeneous polities very well. Proportional systems represent diverse policy
preferences well, although at the cost of government identifiability and responsibility
(Klingeman et al., 1994; Huber and Powell Jr, 1994; Cox, 1997). Lijphart (1984),
Shugart and Carey (1992) and Cox (1997) also note the potential trade-off between
representation and government stability. Coalition governments in highly representa-
tive systems may have shorter duration than governments in majoritarian systems
(but see Schofield, 1993).
The relatively few empirical studies in this literature provide little basis for gen-
eralizing about the position taking incentives across political systems.4 Among com-
parative studies, Lin et al. (1996) find Taiwanese political leaders immediately prior
to the 1992 Legislative Yuan election relatively dispersed in a two-dimensional space
with underlying axes reflecting ethnic identity and economic distributional issues,
respectively. Myagkov and Ordeshook (1998) recover party and candidate positions
in the 1995 Russian Duma election and 1996 Russian presidential election, dispersed
in a two-dimensional space in which the primary axis reflects attitudes towards polit-
ical and economic reform explains most of the spatial variation. Among studies that
specifically consider the effects of the electoral system on spatial incentives, Dow
(1998) finds parties in Chilean Senate elections conducted under the d’Hondt pro-
2 Majoritarian systems may use either single- or multi-member districts. The familiar US and UK cases
use single-member district plurality systems. Examples of majoritarian formulas operating on multi-mem-
ber districts include the former Japanese Diet electoral system, which used the single non-transferable
vote (SNTV) system applied to multi-member districts. For a discussion, see Lijphart (1994, pp. 16–25).
3 Lin et al. (1998) demonstrate that multiparty elections can produce convergent equilibria if parties
maximize vote share and voters are sufficiently uncertain of party and candidate positions. This result,
however, is sensitive to both the specification of voter utility functions and the spatial distribution of vot-
ers.
4 For the purposes of literature review, I limit the definition of empirical spatial theory to those studies
that estimate spatial representations of elections. This excludes studies that incorporate measures of policy
or ideological distance as explanatory variables. The latter analyses are routine.
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portional representation rule clustered at the outer quartiles of the distribution of
voters. In several recent studies, Schofield and Washington University colleagues
present spatial analyses of Israeli, Dutch and German (Nixon et al., 1995; Schofield
et al., 1998), Israeli (Ofek et al., 1998), Italian (Giannetti et al., 1999) and several
other Western European elections (Schofield, 1997b). These studies typically report
estimated party locations dispersed across the electoral space, with some parties in
highly proportional countries such as Italy (pre 1993 electoral reforms: compare
Schofield et al., 1998; Giannetti et al., 1999) and The Netherlands located near the
center of the electoral space. Interestingly, Schofield (1997b) reports that in the late
1970s Great Britain — the archetypal Westminster system — neither the Labour
Party nor the Conservative Party were located near the center of the space. Finally,
studies of the highly majoritarian United States have produced anomalous or at least
inconclusive findings. For example, Rabinowitz (1977) and Poole and Rosenthal
(1984) estimate the locations of United States presidential candidates near the periph-
ery of the distribution of voters. In contrast, Enelow and Hinich (1984) and Enelow
(1988) recover candidates and parties near the center of the electorate.
3. Statistical methodology
To estimate the spatial maps I use a metric multidimensional scaling method
developed by Cahoon and Hinich (Cahoon et al., 1978; Enelow and Hinich, 1984,
Appendix 1; Hinich and Ghobarah, 1999). The maps locate party and voter positions
for each election in a two-dimensional space. I estimate two-dimensional maps
because it is doubtful that a single axis adequately represents electoral competition
in any of these countries. Schofield et al. (1998) argue that two dimensions best
represent Dutch electoral competition. Similarly, Nixon et al. (n.d.) find a two-dimen-
sional solution is best for the 1992 Israeli Knesset election. More generally, Lijphart
(1984) finds the single dimension assumption justified in only three postwar democ-
racies (Ireland, New Zealand, United States). My estimates confirm that one-dimen-
sional maps generally fare poorly compared with two-dimensional scalings.
Briefly, the methodology assumes the jth voter’s evaluation score for party y. Tj(y)
is a function of the spatial distance between the respondent and the party. Party and
candidate evaluation scores are available in recent national election studies conducted
in each country.5 In standard notation:
Tj(y)5bOn
i51
˛(xji- yi)21eiy (1)
where b,0, i indexes the number of dimensions or issues of the election, xji is the
ideal point of voter j on dimension i and yi is the location of party y on the same
5 Cahoon et al. (1978), Enelow and Hinich (1984, Appendix 1) and Hinich and Ghobarah (1999),
Enelow and Hinich (1984) and Hinich and Ghobarah (1999) provide details about the statistical method-
ology.
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axis. The error term, eiy captures unmeasurable, non-systematic influence on Tj(y),
which are normally distributed with zero mean and is independent across voters and
parties. The methodology calculates a maximum likelihood factor analysis of an
adjusted version of the sample covariance matrix of the Tj(y) scores to estimate the
party and candidate positions on the defined axes. The methodology then estimates
voter positions using a least squares regression that includes the estimated party
locations as independent variables. The origin of the space is the mean voter ideal
position on each axis. The use of evaluation scores differs from previous studies that
use party elite surveys or analyses of party manifestos to obtain spatial represen-
tations of party locations. Schofield and co-authors use issue proximity data to esti-
mate spatial representations.
4. Empirical results
4.1. The spatial maps
Figs. 1–4 present the estimated spatial maps. Each map places the estimated party
positions on the density of voter ideal points. Also, the estimated locations of party
leaders and major political figures are presented. These provide a check that the
Fig. 1. Party locations and voter density, Canadian federal election, 1993.
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Fig. 2. Party locations and voter density, France, 1988.
maps scale correctly, as one expects these figures to scale close to their associated
parties. The voter density is estimated using a non-parametric Gaussian kernal and
spline interpolation (Scott, 1992).
Simple visual inspection of the maps reveals both similarities and noticeable dif-
ferences across countries. In all cases the left to right order of parties appears correct.
The Canadian space ranges from the New Democratic Party on the left to the western
Reform Party on the right.6 The French political space is bounded on the left by the
Communist Party and on the right by Jean-Marie le Pen’s National Front. Likud and
Labor anchor the Israeli space, with most voters scaling between the two parties. In
The Netherlands, the PvDA (Labor) scales to the far left, while the conservative
VVD (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) is on the right. The map attests
to the stability of the Dutch political system as it is very similar to that estimated
by Schofield et al. (1998) using both a different methodology and data from the late
1970s. In each country, political leaders scale close to their respective parties. Frits
6 The Canadian map does not estimate the location of Bloc Que´be´cois because the Canadian Election
Study, 1993, does not solicit evaluation scores for this party outside of Que´bec. Nor does the Canadian
Election Study, 1993, solicit evaluation scores for the Reform Party in Que´bec. Consequently, the spatial
map is estimated for Anglophone Canada only.
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Fig. 3. Party locations and voter density, Israeli Knesset election, 1992.
Bolkestein, for example, is the VVD leader and first candidate on the party list. On
the Israeli map, Yitzhak Shamir is adjacent to Likud, while the two Labor leaders, the
late Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, flank that party. The maps recover comparable
leadership — party proximity in the Canadian and French elections. In all the maps,
at least some parties scale away from the central part of the electorate. In the Dutch
and Israeli elections, no party is near the origin.
Although it is not the purpose of this study to provide detailed analyses of the
recovered electoral spaces, several cases present clear interpretations. The Israeli
map, for example, presents a clear left–right horizontal axis corresponding to national
security, the territories and the peace process. The vertical axis reflects the Israeli
secular–nonsecular cleavage. The Dutch map may be interpreted analogously, with
the major axis corresponding to a general left–right and the vertical axis reflecting
a secular–nonsecular split. The French map presents a major left–right dimension
on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis is more difficult to interpret, but likely
corresponds to issues centering on trade, European Union and similar considerations.
The Canadian horizontal axis again captures a general left–right orientation. The
vertical axis likely reflects a populist–elitist dimension, with the Reform Party scaling
to the top of this axis and the Progressive Conservative Party scaling near the bottom
of the axis.
The Canadian map provides the strongest visual evidence of centralizing behavior.
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Fig. 4. Party locations and voter density, Dutch parliamentary election, 1994.
The Liberal Party is adjacent to the origin, as one would expect given the party’s
41% vote share. The Progressive Conservative and New Democratic Parties are about
equidistant from the Liberal Party, with the regionally based Reform Party well away
from the center of the national electoral sample. Despite the Liberal Party’s drubbing
at the polls, it is surprising to see the Conservatives so far from the center of the
space. This may indicate the existence of a non-spatial issue such as “competence”
that influences the estimated position of this party.7
The French map recovers a bimodal distribution of voters. The major node is left
and below the origin; the minor node is right of the origin near the Gaulist UDF
and RPR parties. Francois Mitterrand and the Socialist Party scale closest to the
major node. This is as one would expect given Mitterrand’s victory in the 1988
presidential election and the Socialist Party’s capture of 48% of the legislative seats
in the subsequent Assembly election. The National Front and right-wing nationalist,
Jean-Marie le Pen, scale well to the right of the RPR and UDF, but sufficiently close
7 Issues such as honesty, integrity and competence are non-spatial or “valence” issues in the sense
that one assumes voters have identical preferences on these dimensions. Specifically, more of these attri-
butes are presumably preferred to less. These differ from policy issues such as military spending, scope
of government and similar considerations over which voter preferences differ. For a discussion, see
Stokes (1992).
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to enough voters to account for his 14.6% first ballot share in the presidential elec-
tion.
The Dutch and the Israeli maps provide little evidence that parties pursue centrip-
etal electoral strategies. This is especially true in The Netherlands where parties scale
to the periphery of the distribution of voters. The PvDA, which won the largest share
of parliamentary seats, is only marginally closer to the center of the voter distribution
than the right VVD. The Christian Democratic Party (CDA), consisting of both Cath-
olic and Protestant groups, scales to the top of the vertical axis, while, the socially
liberal Progressive Party (D66) scales to the bottom of this dimension. Their place-
ments suggest the vertical axis captures a social liberal–conservative dimension.
In Israel, Labor and Likud are roughly equidistant from the origin and most voters.
The horizontal national security axis is anchored by Likud and Yitzhak Shamir on
the right and Shimon Peres and Labor on the left. The vertical axis capturing the
Israeli secular–nonsecular division is bracketed by the religious Gush Emunim move-
ment at the bottom and Yitzhak Rabin at the top.
The spatial maps are consistent with received theory: the winning or leading party
in Canada and France is closer to the center of the electorate than the leading parties
in The Netherlands and Israel. No map provides evidence of strong convergent
behavior in the sense of all parties locating near the center of the voter distribution.
Nonetheless, there are apparent differences between the Israeli and Dutch elections
on the one hand, and the French and Canadian elections on the other. More parties
are closer to the center of the electorate in the former countries than in the latter.
Most important, the winning party and candidate in Canada and France, respectively,
is near the origin.
4.2. Measures of spatial centrality
To more formally assess the spatial incentives in each political system, I use a
measure of central tendency developed by Kollman et al. (Kollman et al. 1992, 1993).
The measure, centrality, calculates the relative spatial dispersion of party platforms
in each map, and may be used to make comparisons of the relative party and candi-
date dispersion across maps.
Centrality is calculated for each party or candidate y as the ratio of summed voter
quadratic loss functions. The numerator is the sum of the loss functions between
voters and the location of the median voter ideal point. The denominator is the
sum of loss function between voters and the candidate or party y. Arithmetically,
centrality equals:
C(y)5
OV
j51
uj(median)
OV
j51
uj(y)
(2)
where
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uj(median)52On
i51
(xij2yj(median))2 (3)
and
u(y)52On
i51
(xij2yi)2 (4)
The indices are the same as in Eq. (1). Specifically, xji is the location of voter j on
the ith spatial axis and yi is party y’s location on the same axis. The term yj(median)
is the location of the median voter on the jth axis. Simply, centrality is the ratio of
the sum of squared spatial distances between voters and the median voter, and the
sum of squared spatial distances between voters and party or candidate y. For each
party or candidate, the value of centrality ranges from 0 to 1.8 If party y is near the
median voter, then centrality(y) is approximately 1. If party y is far from the median
voter, then centrality(y) approaches 0. Since centrality is normalized by the distri-
bution of voter ideal points, one can use the measure to compare the relative disper-
sion across maps.9
Table 2 presents the party and candidate spatial locations, corresponding values
of centrality and the mean values of centrality. These figures display clear differences
in the extent of spatial dispersion between the majoritarian and proportional systems.
The mean value of centrality for Israel and The Netherlands is about one-third of
that for France and Canada. There is also considerably more variation in centrality for
the majoritarian systems than the proportional systems. Further, there are systematic
differences in the types of parties returning high and low values of centrality in the
majoritarian and proportional systems. In the majoritarian systems, the parties and
candidates returning lower values of centrality are ideologically extreme parties and
candidates that are not particularly competitive. Examples include French nationalist
Jean-Marie le Pen and the Canadian Reform Party. Most importantly, the winning
candidates and parties in the majoritarian systems consistently return higher values
of centrality. For example, the largest values of centrality in the majoritarian systems
include those for the Canadian Liberal Party and Francois Mitterrand. The pro-
portional systems exhibit consistently lower values of centrality and less variation
in these scores.10
8 Technically, centrality may exceed 1 unless the spatial location that minimizes average spatial dis-
tance across voters corresponds to the location of the median voter. In application, this location is suf-
ficiently close to the location of the median voter that the 0–1 range for centrality is approximated.
9 Kollman et al. (1998) caution against using centrality for comparing spatial dispersion (p. 147), but
this is largely in the context of the extremely contrived voter distributions used in their computer simula-
tions. For voter distributions encountered in empirical studies, this measure is appropriate for cross map
comparisons (Professor Ken Kollman, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, November
1998, personal communication).
10 Because centrality is calculated using quadratic loss, it disproportionally penalizes parties and candi-
dates further from the location of the median voter. To assess whether this effect significantly alters the
interpretation of the maps, I recalculated centrality using absolute distance in the voter utility functions
represented by Eqs. (3) and (4). This revealed no substantive differences in interpretation.
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Table 2
Axis location and centrality
Party/candidate Axis 1 location Axis 2 location Centrality
Canada 1993
PCP 42.09 266.83 0.0983
Liberal 9.74 4.89 0.8658
NDP 228.60 33.42 0.2544
Reform 62.68 88.13 0.0548
Campbell 31.38 254.48 0.1470
Chretien 8.05 16.62 0.6713
Manning 58.56 86.21 0.0587
Mulroney 45.22 284.84 0.0683
McLaugh 212.54 24.53 0.4648
Mean centrality 0.2982
France 1988
Communist 217.26 95.55 0.1640
National Front 76.28 69.22 0.1483
RPR 46.61 29.47 0.3821
PS 214.35 71.58 0.2588
UDF 29.44 33.86 0.4861
Mitterand 215.04 73.86 0.2466
Chirac 45.78 29.45 0.3884
Barre 26.04 31.30 0.5367
LaJoinie 211.59 90.82 0.1809
le Pen 75.70 69.00 0.1498
Mean centrality 0.2942
Israel 1992
Labor 27.53 3.29 0.0743
Likud 3.43 25.97 0.1027
Gush Emunim 2.76 28.20 0.0675
Religious 0.57 29.58 0.0556
Peace Now 28.56 23.63 0.0590
Peres 29.37 1.43 0.0569
Rabin 24.82 6.91 0.0710
Shamir 3.51 26.48 0.0908
Mean centrality 0.0722
The Netherlands 1994
PvDA 251.63 219.80 0.1085
VVD 51.10 24.43 0.1040
D66 11.57 253.86 0.1093
CDA 12.07 59.08 0.0929
Lubbers 23.95 32.08 0.2629
Kok 245.41 3.56 0.1522
Brinkman 16.98 65.90 0.0744
Bolkestein 51.54 36.81 0.0849
Brouwer 222.62 243.03 0.1361
Van Mierlo 5.00 250.13 0.1279
Woltgens 222.21 218.32 0.3102
Mean centrality 0.1421
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To test directly for differences in central tendency between the majoritarian and
proportional systems, I calculated the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon stat-
istic (Mood et al., 1974; Hogg and Craig, 1995). The test statistic, denoted by F,
evaluates the null hypothesis that the values of centrality for the majoritarian and
proportional systems are drawn from the same statistical distribution. Specifically,
if x represents the sample values of centrality calculated from the majoritarian sys-
tems and y represents the sample values of centrality calculated from the proportional
systems, the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon statistic tests the null hypothesis that
F(X)=G(Y) where F(X) and G(Y) are the respective distribution functions of the ran-
dom variables X and Y. Rejection of the null hypothesis provides evidence that there
exist systematic differences in the spatial incentives induced by the majoritarian and
proportional electoral systems.
An additional statistical assessment of spatial incentives induced by electoral sys-
tems is provided by calculating the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon statistic to test the
null hypothesis that systematic differences exist within each electoral system. That
is, systematic differences are tested for within the distribution of centrality in the
Canadian and French elections on the one hand, and the Israeli and Dutch systems
on the other. Failure to reject the null hypothesis in each case supports the argument
that the two majoritarian systems induce similar spatial incentives and, likewise, the
two proportional systems induce similar spatial incentives.
The test statistic, F, is a function of the summed rank values of centrality in each
series. Under the null hypothesis, with a large number of observations, the statistic
is distributed approximately standard normal. For the small samples used in this
study, I calculated the critical test values directly. The test statistic is relatively
powerful in small samples, especially when the major differences between the distri-
butions are in central tendency. The empirical distributions indicate significant differ-
ences in both central tendency and dispersion, but are most pronounced in the mean
values of centrality.
The values of the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon statistic strongly support the hypoth-
esis that systematic differences exist in spatial incentives between the majoritarian
and the proportional systems. Using the standard normal approximation, the test
statistic F=2.96, and rejects at the a=0.01 level the null hypothesis that the values
calculated for majoritarian and proportional systems are drawn from the same statisti-
cal distribution. The standard normal approximation and exact probabilities provide
strong support for the alternative hypothesis that centrality values are significantly
larger in the majoritarian systems than in the proportional systems.
The Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon statistic for the within system comparisons also
reveals the expected patterns. Neither the Canadian–French comparison nor the
Dutch–Israeli comparison reject the null hypothesis that the values of centrality for
each country are drawn from the same statistical distribution at standard levels of
statistical significance (a=0.10). The extent of spatial centralization in Canada and
France is statistically indistinguishable. The same is true for Israel and The Nether-
lands. Simply, the statistical tests reveal the spatial distributions of parties and candi-
dates in the majoritarian systems are statistically equivalent, as are the spatial distri-
butions of parties and candidates in the proportional systems.
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5. Discussion and conclusion
This study’s primary contribution is to provide an explicitly comparative analysis
of electoral systems and spatial incentives. While the literature presents spatial analy-
ses of individual and multiple countries, few provide bases for direct comparison by
estimating spatial representations using the same methodology across political sys-
tems, and none to our knowledge systematically compare the extent of spatial disper-
sion across electoral systems. The estimated maps and corresponding values of cen-
trality support the expectation that the spatial incentives significantly differ between
majoritarian and proportional systems. While none of the four countries exhibit
strong centralizing behavior in the sense that most or all parties are located near the
position of the median voter, the maps reveal that parties in the majoritarian systems
are located significantly closer to the center of the voter distribution than those in
proportional systems.
The estimated maps for the majoritarian systems may understate the true extent
of centripetal spatial incentives since some of the more extreme candidates and par-
ties may be prominent political symbols, but not serious contenders for governing.
This possibility is reflected in the presidential campaign and estimated spatial pos-
itions of French Nationalist Jean-Marie le Pen or, to a much lesser extent, the Canad-
ian Reform Party. There is little motivation for corresponding behavior in the pro-
portional Israeli and Dutch elections because even parties that advocate relatively
extreme ideological views can still expect to influence government policy due to the
low electoral thresholds in these electoral systems.
This study does not seek to evaluate rigorously the policy implications implied
by the electoral maps, except to note that the estimated spatial positions of parties
and political leaders do not necessarily reflect the moderation or extremism of
government policy. Proportional systems may moderate political outcomes through
post-election coalition bargaining and government formation. Schofield and co-
authors (Laver and Schofield, 1990; Schofield, 1993; Laver and Shepsle, 1996; see
also de Swaan, 1973), while investigating models that focus on government forma-
tion, argue coalition governments will typically enact moderate policies (cf. Austin-
Smith and Banks 1988, 1990). Huber and Powell Jr (1994) provide supporting
empirical evidence by reporting an inverse relationship between the extent to which
Western European politics exhibit majoritarian characteristics and the average dis-
tance between the location of the post-election governments and the location of the
median voter. On average, the more proportional the electoral system, the closer the
government is to the median voter.
The spatial maps provide only limited evidence on this question. The estimated
governing position of the Canadian Liberal Party is near the center of the political
space. However, while both the French Socialist Party and President Francois Mitter-
rand are relatively close to the major node of voters, neither is adjacent to the origin
on either dimension. Considering the proportional systems, the averaged position of
the post-election Dutch government, consisting of the coalition of the PvDA, VVD
and D66 parties, is moderate. This is not true, however, in the Israeli case where
Labor was the dominant coalition partner with Meretz (represented by Peace Now)
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as the junior partner. The government also included the ultra orthodox Shas Party
(represented by Religious Parties).
Finally, this study demonstrates the need for empirical research capable of evaluat-
ing the spatial incentives induced by electoral systems. In the context of cross-
national research, Hinich and Munger (1998) point to spatial theory’s central role
in deriving the implications of voting procedures for democratic governance, and
call for further empirical studies clearly predicated on the spatial theory of voting.
Green and Shapiro (1994) also argue the contributions of empirical spatial theory
have not kept pace with theoretical advances. This study provides a modest contri-
bution in this direction, but more significantly demonstrates the need for further
empirical analyses of comparative electoral systems.
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